Four Loci of Agential Intervention

FULL TITLE: Four Loci of Agential Intervention: Putting neuro-interventions in their place
Talk abstract for 2019 Neuroscience and Society conference

Intuitively, neither the term “neurointerventions” nor the special issues that they seem to raise when they are used to influence thought and behaviour, seem difficult to grasp. Alas, scholarly efforts to even define the term “neurointerventions”, let alone to explain why they raise special issues, have had limited success [1-5].

After briefly describing the challenge, recounting some notable efforts to address it, and explaining where I think those efforts stumble, I then present a new framework that offers a promising approach. At the core of this framework is a taxonomy which classifies methods for influencing thought and behaviour according to which of four loci of agential intervention those methods target: pre-agential, sub-agential, agential, and extra-agential. However, precisely where in this taxonomy neurointerventions – or any other method for influencing thought and behaviour – will be located, and what issues they will raise, will hinge on four factors: (i) what theory of mind we presuppose; (ii) what theory of agency we presuppose, (iii) what compositional and causal relations obtain between these loci; and (iv) extrinsic as well as intrinsic factors.

In addition to precisely defining the term “neurointerventions”, and providing a way to ascertain what special issues they might raise and why, this framework also offers four other attractions. Its metaphysical and metaethical neutrality enables it to accommodate (i) different theories of mind and (ii) different theories of agency. Furthermore, by focusing on where, in relation to agency, a given method for influencing thought and behaviour intervenes, this approach provides (iii) the flexibility to embed discussions of neurointerventions within a broader context that also includes (e.g.) gene-editing-based moral enhancement and nudge techniques, and (iv) support for finer-grained moral analyses in which the issues raised are apportioned to interactions between methods, those methods’ sub-components, as well as situational and normative factors.

REFERENCES

[1] Bublitz, Jan Christoph, and Reinhard Merkel (2014). ‘Crimes Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, Harms and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination’, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 8: 51-77.
[2] Bublitz, Jan Christoph (forthcoming). ‘Direct, Indirect, Disrespect: Why means to alter minds matter for the law (and should for ethics).’ in Nicole A Vincent, Thomas Nadelhoffer and Allan McCay (eds.), Neurointerventions and The Law: Regulating Human Mental Capacity (Oxford University Press: New York, NY).
[3] Focquaert, Farah, and Maartje Schermer (2015). ‘Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?’, Neuroethics, 8: 139-51.
[4] Levy, Neil (2007). Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK).
[5] Levy, Neil (forthcoming). ‘Cognitive Enhancement: Defending the Parity Principle.’ in Nicole A Vincent, Thomas Nadelhoffer and Allan McCay (eds.), Neurointerventions and The Law: Regulating Human Mental Capacity (Oxford University Press: New York, NY).