Conscientious Objections, Immutability, and Neuro-Interventions

If we look closely at conscientious objections, what emerges is, in some ways, not dissimilar to a hostage situation. First, because conscience is immutable – that is, we cannot reason or bargain with it – we thus cannot alter its demands. Second, if we do not comply with its demands, then it will inflict incredible inner turmoil and emotional suffering on us. This account is useful because it helps to explain the difference between how we treat conscientious versus other objections.

Typically, when someone requests an exemption from compliance with the law, or some other applicable rule of conduct, we expect them to cite reasons — ones whose strengthcan convince us that they have a valid case (e.g. a justification or an excuse) for non-compliance. However, when it comes to conscientious objections, all that seems to matter ispedigree– i.e. whether the source of the person’s objection is really their conscience – and the reasons that support the dictates of their conscience appear to be irrelevant.

For instance, when a physician refuses to perform an abortion because her faith forbids it, the reason she cites is merely thather faith forbids itnot why it does. And yet, if this is accepted as a valid conscientious objection, then that will suffice to warrant her non-compliance with what other physicians are expected to do. Similarly, when politicians are allowed to take a conscience vote on something – e.g. gay marriage – the whole point is to give them the space to vote in whichever way they wish without expecting them to justify how they voted by citing reasons.

On this account, the reason why we make special room for conscientious objections is because conscience is immutable, and because failure to comply with its demands will cause unbearable torment and suffering. But what if novel neuroscientific interventions could open up discussions with our conscience by making it receptive to reasons? Should this then change how we handle conscientious objections? Specifically, should conscience cease to be treated in a special way – should it cease to have a special status – and should conscientious objectors instead be required to avail themselves of the neuroscientific interventions in order to make their conscience receptive to reasons, rather than expecting the rest of society to make special accommodations for them?

In this talk I will defend two claims. One, that conscientious objections express the (potentially unexplicated) demands of a person’s internal justifying reasons. Two, that the special treatment afforded to conscientious objections – their special status – reflects the way in which internal justifying reasons constrain what we can reasonably be expected to see as a reason, what judgments we may reasonably be expected to make, and how we may reasonably be expected to behave.

In a nutshell, on my account, when we allow someone to just cite the dictates of their conscience, rather than expecting them to cite the reasons that support those dictates, we tacitly acknowledge that given their actual beliefs, desires, values, and so forth, it would be unreasonable for us to expect them to comply with the demands of the relevant rule, law, or standard, or to change their beliefs, desires, values, and so forth to such a degree that we could then reasonably expect them to comply with the demands of the relevant rule, law, or standard. This position, I will argue, supports a negative answer to the above question — namely, that even if neuroscientific interventions of the envisaged sort became available, this should not deprive conscientious objections of their special status.

This is an abstract for a talk scheduled for presentation on May 16, 2018, in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Charles Sturt University, Wagga Wagga, NSW, Australia.